Arti cial neural networks (ANNs) have demonstrated remarkable utility in a variety of challenging machine learning applications. However, their complex architecture makes asserting any formal guarantees about their behavior di cult. Existing approaches to this problem typically consider veri cation as a post facto white-box process, one that reasons about the safety of an existing network through exploration of its internal structure, rather than via a methodology that ensures the network is correct-by-construction.
INTRODUCTION
Arti cial neural networks (ANNs) have emerged in recent years as the primary computational structure for implementing many challenging machine learning applications. eir success has been due in large measure to their sophisticated architecture, typically comprised of multiple layers of connected neurons (or activation functions), in which each neuron represents a possibly non-linear function over the inputs generated in a previous layer. In a supervised se ing, the goal of learning is to identify the proper coe cients (i.e., weights) of these functions that minimize di erences between the outputs generated by the network and ground truth, established via training samples.
eir ability to identify ne-grained distinctions among their inputs through the execution of ).
signi cantly lower than own ), then regardless of the intruder's (ψ ) and subject's (θ ) direction, the ANN controller should output Clear-of-Conflict (as it is unlikely that the intruder can collide with the subject). Unfortunately, even a sophisticated ANN handler used in the ACAS Xu system, although well trained, has been shown to violate this correctness property . Existing approaches that are capable of potentially identifying violations of such properties separate verication from learning Wang et al. 2018c) , which has an inherent disadvantage when veri cation fails, given the complexity and uninterpretibility of these networks. In other words, if ANNs are generated without incorporating provable correctness as part of their training objective, then there is no guarantee that the weights discovered by the training process are provably correct, exempli ed by the above incorrect ANN-controlled ACAS Xu system. e lack of a principled methodology to repair networks that are not veri able, however, short of commencing the training process from scratch, makes the problem of leveraging veri cation counterexamples post facto a challenging exercise for which no credible proposal has been put forth thus far.
In this paper, we target a signi cant generalization of other state-of-the-art veri cation approaches that enables correct-by-construction generation of ANNs with respect to a broad class of correctness properties expressed over the network's inputs. Developing a scalable training technique developed with correctness in mind that nonetheless retains desirable precision is the primary challenge to realizing this goal. Scalability is an important issue for any such strategy given the large size of the input space, and the potentially large number of neurons that comprise the network. Like previous e orts , we employ abstract interpretation methods to generate sound abstractions of both the input space and the network itself.
However, simply generating a safe over-approximation of a network is not necessarily useful because an excessively over-approximate abstraction may provide imprecise information on how to further optimize the network for correctness. e di culty in balancing the goal of scalable veri cation with accurate optimization in our context arises from the need to integrate correctness constraints within the gradient descent optimization loop that sits at the core of the training procedure. When the property to verify is locally de ned, for example, as in the case of robustness, it may be possible to bake-in these considerations as part of the abstraction itself, leading to a clean characterization of the optimization procedure in terms of the over-approximation induced by the abstraction.
In contrast, in our case, the structure of the optimization procedure must be signi cantly di erent since we do not know to guide the optimization loop by the logical characteristics of the correctness property a priori. To overcome this challenge, we obtain such information on the y as shown by the work ow depicted schematically in Figure 2 . Our approach takes as input a correctness property (Φ in , Φ out ) that prescribes desired network output behavior using logic constraints Φ out when the inputs to the network are within a domain described by Φ in . In particular, our training procedure involves an abstract domain D (e.g., the interval domain) and a re nement loop over our abstraction of the input space, expressed in terms of correctness properties de ned over these inputs. A non-zero loss ϵ of correctness of an input abstraction Φ i in , obtained by an abstract interpretation over the abstract domain D via estimating the loss from the abstracted output F D (Φ i in ) of the network to the correctness constraint Φ out , may indicate a potential violation of the network's output correctness. is loss can then be used to optimize the network's weights to mitigate the loss of correctness on F D (Φ i in ) (the right loop of Figure 2 ). On the other hand, since the amount of imprecision introduced by the input space abstraction Φ i in is correlated with the precision of the abstracted network output F D (Φ i in ), we additionally propose a re nement mechanism over the input space abstraction, optimized for this imprecision (the le loop of Figure 2 ). is abstraction re nement process allows us to apply gradient descent methods to construct networks that are provably correct, Notably, our correct-by-construction generation of ANNs can be applied with standard ANN training algorithms, without comprising the accuracy guarantees o ered by classical optimization methods (the top of Figure 2 ). is paper makes the following contributions:
(1) We present an abstract interpretation-guided training strategy for building correct-byconstruction neural networks, de ned with respect to a rich class of correctness properties that go well beyond local robustness assertions. (2) We de ne an input space abstraction re nement loop that reduces training on input data to training on input space partitions, where the precision of the abstraction is, in turn, guided by a notion of correctness loss as determined by the correctness property. (3) We formalize soundness claims that capture correctness guarantees provided by our methodology; these results characterize the ability of our approach to ensure correctness with respect to domain-speci c correctness properties. (4) We have implemented our ideas in a tool (A ) and applied it to a challenging benchmark, the ACAS Xu collision avoidance dataset (Julian et al. 2016; ). We provide a detailed evaluation study quantifying the e ectiveness of our approach and assess its utility to ensure correctness without compromising accuracy. We additionally provide a comparison of our approach with a post facto counterexample-guided veri cation strategy that provides strong evidence for the bene ts of A 's methodology compared to such 1:4 Xuankang Lin, He Zhu, Roopsha Samanta, and Suresh Jagannathan Fig. 2 . We train a neural network with respect to a correctness property that induces constraints on the inputs (Φ in ) and outputs (Φ out ). The network depicted on the top is one that is not trained with verification in mind -for any valid input, it produces an output, whose loss is calculated to readjust and optimize the weights of the network. The pipeline depicted on the bo om defines A 's architecture; here, inputs are defined in terms of a partition of the input space (Φ
in ). Intuitively, we can think of the collection of these input space splits as defining a partitioning abstraction over the input space. The network is trained over abstractions of the original's propagation and activation functions constructed by an abstract transformer F D (Singh et al. 2019b) , guided by the correctness loss imposed by F D and Φ out , while generating new weights, additionally refines the input space abstraction guided by the correctness loss.
techniques. ese experiments justify our claim that synthesis of synthesize correct-byconstruction networks is feasible even when the correctness properties under consideration are highly sophisticated. e remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In the next section, we provide a simple motivating example that illustrates our approach. Section 3 provides background and context. Section 4 presents a formalization of our approach. Details about A 's implementation and evaluation are provided in Section 5. Related work and conclusions are given in Sections 6 and 7, resp.
ILLUSTRATIVE EXAMPLE
We illustrate and motivate the key components of our approach using a realistic albeit simple end-to-end example. We consider the construction of a learning-enabled system for autonomous driving. e learning objective is to identify potentially dangerous objects within a prescribed range of the vehicle's current position.
Problem Setup. For the purpose of this example, we simplify our scenario, depicted in Figure 3 , by assuming that we track only a single object and that the information given by the vehicle's radar is a feature vector of size two, containing the object's normalized relative speed ∈ [−5, 5] and its relative angular position θ ∈ [−π , π ] in a polar coordinate system with our vehicle located in the center. Here, > 0 means the vehicle is ge ing closer to the object with the speed of | |; < 0 means our vehicle is moving away from the object; and, = 0 means the object and vehicle are moving in lock-step with respect to each other.
Consider an implementation of an ANN for this problem that uses a 2-layer ReLU neural network F with initialized weights as depicted in Figure 4 . e network takes an input vector x = ( , θ ) and outputs a vector = 1 , 2 , where 1 and 2 are the prediction scores for action Report and action Ignore, respectively. e advisory system picks the action with the higher prediction score as the result. For simplicity, both layers in F are linear layers with 2 neurons and without bias terms. An element-wise ReLU activation function relu(x) = max(x, 0) is applied a er the rst layer. In this example, we assume the activation function in each layer is a simple linear combination of the inputs whose coecients are given by the weights associated with the function's input edges. us, p 1 is de ned as w 1 + w 2 θ = 4.5 where the initial weight assignment shown assigns 1 to w 1 and .5 to w 2 . e output of p 1 is fed into a ReLU unit that emits 4.5 (since 4.5 > 0). e output layer of the network again computes a linear combination of the ReLU outputs, which serve as its inputs, using the weight coe cients depicted.
Correctness Property. To serve as a useful advisory system, we can ascribe some correctness properties that we would like the network to always satisfy, as discussed in Sec. 1. In this example, we focus on one such correctness property, de ned below. Our approach generalizes to an arbitrary number of such correctness properties that one may want to enforce in a learning-enabled system.
Φ : Objects in front of the vehicle that are static or moving closer to our vehicle should always be reported.
We can interpret the assumptions of "static or moving closer" and "in front of " in terms of predicates over feature vector components such as ≥ 0 and θ ∈ [0.5, 2.5] 2 , respectively. Using this representation and recalling that ∈ [−5, 5], the correctness property we want to ensure can be formulated as:
Observe that the network shown in Figure 4 does not satisfy this property as discussed above. us, Φ (and, more generally, the correctness properties considered by our system) can be expressed using a pair of predicates (Φ in , Φ out ) specifying the assumptions Φ in on the network input and the corresponding requirements Φ out on the network output.
Correctness Loss Function. To quantify how incorrect a neural network is, we de ne a distance function between the output of the neural network (on inputs satisfying the input predicate Φ in ) and the output predicate Φ out . For this example, we can de ne the distance of the network output 2 We pick [0.5, 2.5] because it is slightly wider than the front view angle of [ 
where dist e (·) is the standard Euclidean space distance function. Clearly, when dist( , Φ out ) = 0, it follows that satis es the output predicate Φ out . e distance function can be used as a loss function, among other training objectives (e.g., optimizing the ANN to mimic an expert's decisions), to train the neural network using a training set. However, a general correctness property like Φ is de ned over an in nite set of data; since training necessarily is performed using only a nite set of samples, we cannot generalize any observations made on just these samples to assert a general correctness property on the trained network with respect to Φ.
Our approach, therefore, leverages abstract interpretation techniques to generate sound abstractions of both the network input space and the network itself. By training on an abstract input space, our method obtains a nite approximation of the in nite set of possible network behaviors. By training on a network's abstraction, our technique is correct-by-construction, intensionally optimizing over the abstraction's worst cases on correctness loss.
We parameterize our approach on any abstract domain that can soundly approximate a neural network's behavior so that an abstract output is guaranteed to subsume all possible outputs for the set of inputs being abstracted. In the example, we consider a simple interval abstract domain I that has been used for neural network veri cation Wang et al. 2018c) .
For example, an interval abstraction of our 2-layer ReLU network is shown in Figure 5 . Intervals maintain a maximum and minimum bound for each neuron, and abstract the concrete neural network computation F using interval arithmetic (Moore et al. 2009 ), denoted as F I . Let us denote the lower bound and upper bound of a neuron u as u and u, respectively. Using interval arithmetic, u and u can be computed from the bounds of neurons in the previous layer. For example, for neuron p 2 : p 2 = 1 · + (−1) · θ = −2.5 and p 2 = 1 · + (−1) · θ = 4.5. For each neuron, the (abstracted) ReLU function applies to its lower and upper bounds directly, since bound values are maintained explicitly. Consider abstract value propagation from p 2 to q 2 . By de nition of ReLU, the lower bound of neuron q 2 is reset to 0 while its upper bound is unchanged.
Applying these rules, the bounds on the output layer can be computed as 1 ∈ [−4.25, 6 .25] and
Our approach leverages the neural network abstraction to quantify the loss of correctness on the abstract domain. To simply the exposition, we create a new temporary variable o and apply the interval abstract transformer for the assignment o := 2 − 1 . e transformer then computes interval bounds for o , which produces [−6.125, 11.875] , from the bounds generated for 1 and 2 . We rewrite Φ out in the correctness property as o ≤ 0 (i.e., 1 ≥ 2 ).
We de ne a correctness loss function L D (F , Φ in , Φ out ), parameterized by an abstract domain D (in the example D is the interval abstract domain I), to measure the worst-case distance between an abstracted neural network output F I (Φ in ), e.g., −6.125 ≤ o ≤ 11.875 in the example, and the output predicate Φ out of the correctness property, e.g., o ≤ 0 in the example: −6.125,11.875] 
where dist e (·) is the standard Euclidean space distance function. e correctness loss function L D enumerates all possible neural network outputs that are subsumed by the abstract network output to nd the one that has the highest distance from Φ out . When L D returns 0, the abstracted output is subsumed by the output predicate Φ out of the correctness property; and, therefore, all possible inputs subsumed by the abstracted network's input region Φ in are guaranteed to be correct. However, in our example, L D returns 11.875; that is, the worst case correctness loss occurs on the upper bound of the abstract neural network output.
Training on an Abstract Domain. Leveraging the correctness loss function, our approach derives the gradient of the loss w.r.t. the network weights and, in usual fashion, applies a gradient descent optimization algorithm to update the network weights. Note that, leveraging the interval abstraction, the correct loss function L D (F , Φ in , Φ out ) can be implemented using MaxPooling and MinPooling units, and hence is di erentiable. Since an interval abstract domain is suited for di erentiation and gradient descent, we can use o -the-shelf automatic di erentiation frameworks (Paszke et al. 2017) to backpropagate the gradient of the correctness loss function to readjust the neural network weights end-to-end so as to improve the correctness of the neural network.
Input Space Abstraction Re nement. An ANN is correct with respect to property (Φ in , Φ out ) if for every input that satis es Φ in , the network produces an output that satis es Φ out . When applied to an abstract network, the correctness loss function measures the degree of imprecision in the abstracted output. Our goal is to minimize this imprecision, making it as close as possible to the behavior of the concrete network, without violating correctness. But, imprecision in the abstracted output is directly correlated to the size of the input domain. us, identifying ways to reduce this size, without compromising correctness or scalability, is critical. e correctness loss function provides a direction for applying gradient descent to train on neural network abstractions. Like standard ANN training algorithms, we could iteratively leverage the correctness loss function L D to update the neural network weights until reaching convergence. However, L D may be overly imprecise since the amount of imprecision introduced by the neural network abstraction is correlated with the size of the input region described by Φ in . Observe that To use more accurate gradients for network weight optimization, based on the above observation, during training, our approach also iteratively partitions the input region Φ in to aid the abstract interpreter. In other words, we seek an input space abstraction re nement mechanism that reduces imprecise correctness loss introduced by abstract interpretation. Notably, incorporating input space abstraction re nement with the gradient descent optimizer does not compromise the soundness of our approach. As long as all sub-regions of Φ in are provably correct, the network's correctness with respect to Φ in trivially holds. However, the simplistic input abstraction re nement mechanism described above does not work in practice because it partitions every dimension; its complexity is thus exponential to the number of dimensions. To overcome this weakness, we apply an optimization-based heuristic similar to the mechanism proposed by (Wang et al. 2018c ) that utilizes the correctness loss function to pick an input space dimension along which a single bisection in each training iteration is performed. In the example, assume dimension is chosen for input space partitioning. In the next training iteration, we show the partitioned input sub-regions and their correctness loss:
(1) For ∈ [0, 2.5] and θ ∈ [0.5, 2.5], correctness loss L D = 5.625; (2) For ∈ [2.5, 5] and θ ∈ [0.5, 2.5], correctness loss L D = 9.375; e result shows that the maximum correctness loss decreases from 11.875 to 9.375.
Iterative Training. In fact, our ANN correct-by-construction algorithm interweaves input space abstraction re nement and gradient descent training on a network abstraction in each training iteration by leveraging the correctness loss function produced by the network abstract interpreter (as depicted in Figure 2 ), until a provably correct ANN is trained. For our illustrative example, we set the learning rate of the optimizer to be 0.01. In our experiment, the maximum correctness loss among all re ned input space abstractions drops to 0 a er 16 iterations. Convergence was achieved by partitioning the input space Φ in into 123 pieces. e trained ANN is guaranteed to satisfy the correctness property (Φ in , Φ out ).
BACKGROUND
De nition 3.1 (Neural network). Neural networks are functions F :
De nition 3.2 (Abstract domain).
An abstract domain D is de ned by a tuple of D c , D a , α, γ ,T with α(·) and γ (·) being Galois connections
Here D c and D a are the domains of concrete and abstract elements, respectively. α(·) : D c → D a is the abstraction function that maps concrete elements to abstract elements and
is a set of transformer pairs over D c and D a .
De nition 3.3 (D-compatible). Given abstract domain
(1) for every layer (·) in F , there exists a di erentiable abstract transformer T a such that (·),T a ∈ T , and (2) for every activation function σ (·) in F , there exists a di erentiable abstract transformer T a such that σ (·),T a ∈ T .
For a D-compatible neural network F , we denote by
To reason about a neural network over some abstract domain D, we need to rst characterize what it means for an ANN to operate over D.
De nition 3.4 (Evaluation over Abstract Domain).
Given an abstract domain D and a neural network F that is D-compatible, the evaluation of F over D and a range of inputs X , denoted as
. In other words, F D (X ) de nes the over-approximated output that covers all possible outputs corresponding to any input belong to X . is is formulated in the following theorem. 
Although our approach is parametric over abstract domains, we require the abstract transformers T a associated with these domains to be di erentiable, to enable the training over worst-cases over-approximated by D via gradient-descent style optimization algorithm.
CORRECT-BY-CONSTRUCTION TRAINING
Our approach aims to train an ANN F with respect to a correctness property Φ, which is formally de ned in Section 4.1. e core observation underlying our approach is that although the abstract transformer based on the abstract domain D provides only a loose bound on the abstracted output, F can nonetheless be trained to make this bound much tighter to improve the quality of its correctness guarantees. To this end, the training procedure must use precise gradient information for optimization. Section 4.2 introduces the idea of input space abstraction and re nement as mechanisms that can reduce imprecise gradient optimization over D. Speci cally, an input space abstraction induces a set of non-overlapping partitioned input domains. Section 4.3 formally de nes a correctness loss function L D , over D that supplies the gradient of the loss function to aid automated end-to-end di erentiation. e correctness loss function is useful in guiding both the optimization of F 's weights and re ning the input space abstraction. is abstraction re nement mechanism is the key to our training algorithm.
Correctness Property
e correctness properties we consider are expressed as logical propositions over the network's inputs and outputs. We assume that an ANN correctness property checks the outputs for violations, given assumptions on the inputs. Formally, De nition 4.1 (Correctness Property). Given a neural network F : R d → R e , a correctness property Φ = (Φ in , Φ out ) is a pair in which Φ in de nes a bounded input domain over R d , and Φ out is an arbitrary boolean combination of linear inequalities over the network output vector R e . Speci cally, Φ in is in the form [x, x] where x is a d-dimensional vector of the lower bound of the network inputs and x is the upper bound. We de ne an auxliary function size to measure the size of an input domain Φ in :
Example 4.2. In Section 2, the correctness property (Φ in , Φ out ) we wanted to train and verify was of the form:
Here, Φ in is the input domain of the correctness property that captures the range of valid values for and θ , and Φ out de nes a predicate on the network's output vector.
). In practice, we formulate any Boolean combination of linear inequalities on the output of the network Φ out as a sequence of additional linear and max-pooling layers. e veri cation problem is hence reduced to nding whether the scalar output of the modi ed network can reach a negative value 3 (see Section 2 for an example).
Input Space Abstraction Refinement
Recall that in Section 2 we illustrated how an input space abstraction re nement mechanism could help reduce imprecise worst-case correctness loss. We formally de ne this notion here. Given a correctness property Φ = (Φ in , Φ out ), an input space abstraction decomposes Φ in into a set of non-overlapping intervals Φ i in such that Φ in = i Φ i in . De nition 4.3 (Input Space Abstraction). An input space abstraction S re nes a correctness
, meaning that re ned input domains are non-overlapping. Two abstractions S 1 and S 2 are non-overlapping i the input domains of any pair of their correctness properties are non-overlapping. We use |S | to denote the number of correctness properties included in S. Given a neural network F , and a correctness property Φ with input space abstraction S, we have
Example 4.4. In Section 2, the input domain of the correctness property (Φ in , Φ out ) in Example 4.2 was decomposed into two non-overlapping input domains Φ 0
. Armed with these de nitions, we can now formally state our central notion of input space abstraction re nement:
De nition 4.5 (Input Space Abstraction Re nement). A well-founded abstraction re nement is a binary relation over a set of input abstractions S = {S 1 , S 2 , . . . S n } such that: A : Abstraction Refinement-Guided Training for Provably Correct Neural Networks 1:11 (re nement) Given a correctness property (Ψ in , Ψ out ), and an input space abstraction S,
, and, (composition) ∀S 1 , S 2 , S 3 , S 4 ∈ S, S 1 , S 3 and S 2 , S 4 are resp. non-overlapping ∧ S 1 S 2 ∧ S 3 S 4 =⇒ S 1 ∪ S 3 S 2 ∪ S 4 e re exivity, transitivity, and compositional requirements for a well-founded re nement are natural. If (Ψ in , Ψ out ) is a correctness property, then S {(Ψ in , Ψ out )} if the output predicates in S are logically equivalent to Ψ out and the union of all input domains in S is equivalent to Ψ in . Intuitively, this relation allows Ψ in to be safely decomposed into a set of sub-domains. Notably, re ning an abstract input domain in this way does not compromise correctness:
By induction on De nition 4.5. We only show the case when S 2 is a single correctness property {Φ = (Φ in , Φ out )} and S 1 is a re nement of S 2 in which the input domain Φ in is decomposed into i Φ i in . We prove if F is correct with respect to S 1 then it is also correct to S 2 . By De nition 4.3, from F S 1 we have:
Given the hypothesis:
we obtain:
which leads to F (Φ in , Φ out ) by De nition 4.3. Hence, F S 2 .
Correctness Loss Function
For an output predicate Φ out , we de ne the distance function that quanti es the distance from an output vector ∈ R e to Φ out by
where dist e (·) is the standard Euclidean space distance function. We further extend this notion to quantify the distance of an abstracted output to an output predicate Φ out , based on which the correctness loss function is formally de ned.
De nition 4.7 (Correctness Loss Function). Given an abstract domain D, a D-compatible neural network F , and a correctness property (Φ in , Φ out ), the correctness loss function from an abstracted output us, the correctness loss function enumerates all possible neural network outputs that are subsumed by the abstract network output to nd the one that has the highest distance from Φ out ; this output corresponds to the worst-case correctness distance from the abstract output on the abstract domain D to Φ out . Figure 6 visualizes the de nition of the correctness loss function L D . e seemingly formidable de nition of L D (F , Φ in , Φ out ) can be computed e ciently especially when D is designed to have maximum and minimum values only appearing on the vertices of an abstract element as depicted in Figure 6 . is condition holds for common abstract domains such as the interval, zonotope, hybrid zonotope , and DeepPoly (Singh et al. 2019b) . Observe that L D is di erentiable since it can be encoded via a MaxPooling unit for such domains.
From the de nition of correctness loss function, it follows naturally that when L D (F , Φ in , Φ out ) becomes 0, we can ensure the correctness of F against the correctness property. is is formulated in the following theorem. 
Since dist(·) is a non-negative function, we have:
A re ned input space abstraction leads to smaller or equal worst-case correctness loss. Consider example 4.4: when we decompose Φ in to Φ 0 in and Φ 1 in , as illustrated in Section 2, the worst-case correctness loss on both partitioned input domains decreases. is intuition is formalized by the following theorem.
If Ψ in is an input domain that is partitioned from Φ in , we prove that the correctness loss on Ψ in can be reduced from that on Φ in . By De nition 3.2 and De nition 3.4,
Intuitively, since the over-approximated output corresponding to a range of inputs must cover all outputs from these inputs, the approximated output of a subset Ψ in must be within that of the set that covers Ψ in . erefore, by De nition 4.7,
Finally, we can extend the notion of correctness loss from over a correctness property to over an input space abstraction.
De nition 4.10 (Abstract Correctness Loss). Given an abstract domain D, a D-compatible neural network F , a correctness property (Φ in , Φ out ), and input space abstraction S, the abstract correctness loss of F with respect to S is denoted by
is essentially an accumulation of correctness loss of re ned correctness properties encompassed within the input space abstraction S. Note that L D (F , S) is weighted and proportional to the size of the input domain of each re ned correctness property included in S.
We extend eorem 4.8, showing that when correctness loss reduces to 0, we can prove the correctness of the neural network over the input space abstraction.
Intuitively, when training reduces correctness loss on each partitioned input domain to 0, the network is correct on every concrete input subsumed by these input domains. By De nition 4.10, since both size and L D are non-negative, when L D (F , S) = 0, we have:
By eorem 4.8,
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Similarly, we extend eorem 4.9, showing that input space abstraction re nement leads to smaller or equal correctness loss. is is expressed in the following theorem.
By induction on De nition 4.5. We only show the case when S 2 is a single correctness property {Φ = (Φ in , Φ out )} and S 1 is a re nement of S 2 in which the input domain Φ in is decomposed into i Φ i in . We prove a er an input space abstraction re nement, the correctness loss over the re ned input space abstraction reduces.
is result is straightforward following eorem 4.9. Given the hypothesis:
Algorithm
Our correct-by-construction ANN training algorithm is given in Algorithm 1. e algorithm takes as an input an initial input space abstraction S, which simply corresponds to a prescribed correctness property. While aiming at guaranteeing correctness, it additionally takes a set of labeled training data {(x train , label )} as an input in order to achieve a desired accuracy on the trained model. In each training iteration from Line 3 to Line 19, the algorithm mixes network weight optimization and input space abstraction re nement. From Line 3 to Line 6 of Algorithm 1, we obtain the correctness loss L D (F , S) of the current input space abstraction S that totals the weighted worst-case correctness loss (with respect to the abstract domain D) over all possible correctness counterexamples to the correctness properties de ned in S. Since the computation of F is over-approximated, it follows that, if L D (F , S) reduces to 0, the neural network F is guaranteed to be correct with respect to the prescribed correctness property. In the algorithm, the goal is to train F to reduce the correctness loss to a very small threshold ϵ D . Algorithm 1 records in A the accuracy loss with respect to Input: Abstract domain D, D-compatible neural network F , input space abstraction S, learning rate η ∈ R + , training data set {(x train , label )}, correctness loss bound ϵ D ∈ R ≥0 , accuracy loss bound ϵ A ∈ R ≥0 ; Output: Optimized F whose correctness and accuracy loss are bounded by ϵ D and ϵ A , resp; 1 ì W ← all weights in F to optimize; 2 while True do the given training examples X train and Y label . In Line 3, the function can be set to a standard loss function in machine learning, such as the cross-entropy loss. For the optimization step of Algorithm 1, Line 7 to Line 9 applies gradient-descent on the abstraction of F leveraging the worst-case loss L D (F , S) and the fact that L D is di erentiable in our framework. In the implementation, this step is aided by PyTorch (Paszke et al. 2017) , an o -the-shelf automatic di erentiation library. We also take accuracy loss into account at this step.
e code snippet in Algorithm 1 from Line 10 to Line 19 heuristically picks a few re ned correctness properties in the input space abstraction S that account for more correctness loss than average. is heuristic selection strategy aims to assign the highest priority for loss reduction to the most imprecise cases. As illustrated in Section 2, input space abstraction re nement is performed at Line 14, enabling the optimization process to be improved with more accurate gradient information.
is snippet can be shown to satisfy the re nement relation (De nition 4.5), as formulated in the following theorem: T 4.13 (V R ). For any input space abstraction S, the code snippet of Algorithm 1 starting from Line 10 to Line 19 yields an input space abstraction S such that S S.
We can formalize the soundness guarantees o ered by our approach.
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Xuankang Lin, He Zhu, Roopsha Samanta, and Suresh Jagannathan C 4.14 (A S ). Given abstract domain D, D-compatible neural network F , initial input space abstraction S of correctness properties, the output neural network F from Algorithm 1 is sound with respect to S, i.e., F S, as long as the correctness loss reduces to 0. P . From eorem 4.13, we know for any input space abstraction S generated during the execution of Algorithm 1, S S. en by eorem 4.11 and eorem 4.6, we have L D (F , S ) = 0 =⇒ F S =⇒ F S.
We note that Corollary 4.14 holds regardless of the speci c re nement heuristic used in Line 14, although an e cient re nement heuristic plays a crucial role in making the whole approach scalable. One such re nement heuristic is shown in Algorithm 2 which exploits gradient information to re ne an input space abstraction along one chosen dimension of Φ in for input domain bisection.
Input: Input predicate Φ in , correctness loss L; Output: An input dimension for input domain partitioning; At the high-level, Algorithm 2 generalizes the iterative re nement strategy in (Wang et al. 2018c ) by leveraging the di erentiable correctness loss function. e intuition is that the gradient of the correctness loss approximates the sensitivity of the loss to each input feature. Just like computing partial derivatives with respect to weights during neural network optimization, Algorithm 2 computes partial derivatives of correctness loss with respect to speci c dimensions of the input domain and picks the largest one as the rst target for Algorithm 1 to bisect. e heuristic score s is a coarse approximation of the cumulative gradient over one dimension. A larger cumulative gradient of an input dimension suggests greater sensitivity of this dimension to decreasing correctness loss. erefore, picking this dimension for input domain bisection is expected to be er reduce an over-approximative correctness loss than other dimensions.
EVALUATION
We have performed a comprehensive evaluation of our approach to validate the feasibility of building correct-by-construction neural networks over a range of sophisticated correctness properties. All experiments reported in this section were performed on a standard MacBook Pro with 2.3GHz CPU and 8GB memory.
ACAS Xu Dataset
Our evaluation study centers around the network architecture and correctness properties described in the Airborne Collision Avoidance System for Unmanned Aircra (ACAS Xu) dataset (Julian et al. 2016; . A family of 45 neural networks are used in the avoidance system; each of these networks consists of 6 hidden layers with 50 neurons in each hidden layer. ReLU activation functions are applied to all hidden layer neurons. All 45 networks take a feature vector of size 5 as input that encodes various aspects of an airborne environment including:
(1) ρ, "the distance from one's own airbone ship to another airborne intruder"; (2) θ , "the angle to the intruder relative to one's own ship's heading direction"; (3) ψ , "the heading angle of an intruder relative to one's own ship's heading direction"; (4) own , "the speed of one's own ship"; (5) int , "the speed of a potential intruder". e outputs of the networks are prediction scores over 5 advisory actions. As discussed earlier, these advisories include: Clear-of-Conflict, Weak Right, Strong Right, Weak Le , and Strong Le .
e action with the minimum prediction score is used as the advised action provided to navigation and control components.
Property Description
If the intruder is distant and is signi cantly slower than one's own ship, the score of a Clear-of-Conflict advisory will always be below a certain xed threshold.
If the intruder is distant and is signi cantly slower than one's own ship, the score of a Clear-of-Conflict advisory will never be maximal.
If the intruder is directly ahead and is moving towards one's own ship, the score for Clear-of-Conflict will not be minimal.
If the intruder is directly ahead and is moving away from one's own ship but at a lower speed than that of the ownship, the score for Clear-of-Conflict will not be minimal.
If the intruder is near and approaching from the le , the network advises Strong Right.
If the intruder is su ciently far away, the network advises Clear-of-Conflict.
If vertical separation is large, the network will never advise a strong turn. ϕ 8
For a large vertical separation and a previous Weak Le advisory, the network will either output Clear-of-Conflict or continue advising Weak Le . ϕ 9
Even if the previous advisory was Weak right, the presence of a nearby intruder will cause the network to output a Strong le advisory instead. ϕ 10 For a far away intruder, the network advises Clear-of-Conflict. Following , we reason about the safety of the ACAS Xu system in terms of its aggregate ability to preserve 10 correctness properties (see Table 1 ). Each of the 45 neural networks is supposed to satisfy some subset of these properties. All correctness properties Φ speci ed in can be formulated in terms of input (Φ in ) and output (Φ out ) predicates as discussed in Section 4.1.
Input predicates are formalized as constraints on input vectors. For example, correctness property ϕ 1 states that "when the intruder is distant and signi cantly slower than one's own ship, then the score of a Clear-of-Conflict advisory action should always be below a certain threshold". Informal notions such as "intruder is distant" and "intruder is signi cantly slower than ownship" are concretely interpreted in an input predicate, for example, as "ρ ≥ 55947.691" and " own ≥ 1145 ∧ int ≤ 60", respectively. e corresponding output predicate is formalized by the constraint that "the Clear-ofConflict score will always be less than 1500." e interpretations we use in our experiments are adapted directly from .
Similar to the illustrative example in Section 2, we can quantify a correctness violation distance
where coc is the maximum possible value for prediction score of a Clear-of-Conflict advisory action. As an example of a more sophisticated correctness property, ϕ 5 states that "if the intruder is near and approaching from the le , the network advises Strong Right". e input predicate can be formulated as constraints on input feature vectors as before, while the output predicate asserts that "the prediction score for strong right is minimal among all categories"; recall that ACAS Xu system chooses the action with minimum prediction score as its advised action. Interpreted under abstract domains that concretize an output abstraction into lower and upper bounds, this output predicate asserts that ∀i = {1, . . . , 5} ∧ i StrongRight, sr ≤ i where sr represents the upper bound of prediction score for Strong Right and i is the lower bound, respectively. To quantify the output predicate violation for further optimization, we can formulate a suitable distance metric as before:
where dist i ( , ϕ 5 ) = max( sr − i , 0).
Setup
Our evaluation studies the utility of building correct-by-construction networks that satisfy this set of correctness properties. We show that even in the simple scenarios considered by the ACAS Xu benchmark, a dynamic re nement mechanism capable of generating ne-grained input abstractions is essential to balancing notions of safety and accuracy.
For our experiments, we consider the construction of 8 distinct networks, each of which are expected to satisfy a particular set of correctness properties; to test the ability of our system to handle sophisticated correctness conditions, these properties include meaningful conjunctions of the base set of 10 correctness properties identifed in . ese networks have the same structure as the original 45 networks from Acas Xu, but as explained below were trained using a more curated and balanced dataset than was used in the original benchmark. In Table 2 , we present details of this base setup.
Unfortunately, the training and test set of ACAS Xu is not publicly available online. We, therefore, used the provided networks given in (Julian et al. 2016 ) as oracles to sample data points. A total of 10k training set data and 5k test set data were sampled from 8 networks in the 45 network array that cover all occuring correctness property conjunctions in ACAS Xu. However, there is a degree of bias in almost all its networks' behaviors. Networks trained on data that results in predicted outputs overwhelmingly biased towards Clear-of-Conflict advisories are not particularly useful for an evaluation study such as ours. Clearly, applying our training algorithm over the dataset used to construct such a network may trivially yield a safe network that exhibits high accuracy with respect to the original by simply returning this advisory regardless of the environment con guration found in the test data. Indeed, many of the ACAS Xu datasets used to train its networks exhibit this kind of bias, an unsurprising result given that much of the time, an unmanned controller is operating in airspace free of intruder objects.
Nonetheless, such biases complicate evaluation. We overcome the presence of these imbalances in our training data by structuring our sampling procedure to ensure that output labels are uniformily distributed among the set of advisories under consideration. All of our experiments are conducted against these more equitably balanced datasets. Table 2 . Training results for various networks and the properties we expect them to satisfy taken from the ACAS Xu dataset.
Because the networks described in Table 2 were not trained with safety in mind, Column Safe? indicates whether the trained network (equipped with no guarantees of safety) was able to be validated by ReluVal (Wang et al. 2018c ), a state-of-the-art neural network veri er that, unlike systems such as Reluplex , does not rely on SMT theorem provers, and thus exhibits signi cantly be er scalability properties. e datasets used to train each network was chosen to facilitate its ability to satisfy a particular correctness property (or conjunction of such properties). Observe that of the 8 correctness properties considered, only two networks (N 1 and N 8 ) were deemed to be safe; notably, the safety properties tested for these networks were among the simplest of properties we considered. Table 3 presents statistics on the e ectiveness of applying Algorithm 1 to generate 8 new networks, each corresponding to the networks described in Table 2 , but trained with the corresponding correctness properties in mind. All of our networks were trained with a network abstraction based on the DeepPoly abstract domain (Singh et al. 2019b) , which combines oating point polyhedra with intervals. During each epoch (i.e., each iteration of the outermost while loop in Algorithm 1), our implementation re nes up to 100 abstractions at a time that expose the largest correctness losses. e speci c optimization setup follows standard practices. We set the learning rate to be 0.005 and follow a learning rate decay policy if the loss has been stable for some time. Table 3 . Using A to build correct-by-construction networks for the ACAS Xu dataset
Applying A to ACAS Xu
From Table 3 , there are two distinguishing cases that directly shows the importance of nergrained abstractions, as indicated by networkN 5 andN 7 . Training a network with these properties in mind requires running over a large number of epochs and abstractions, suggesting that they are harder properties to satisfy to convergence. e time to train these networks, with input space abstraction re nement enabled is quite fast, typically on the order of a few seconds. On the other hand, without re nement, training on a small number of coarse-grained abstractions can lead to non-termination (or lack of convergence); indeed, with relatively few training samples used in our experiments, it is conceivable to get trapped in some local minima when re nement is not exploited. A timeout is triggered a er 2000 epochs.
Accuracy Preservation
ere is important interplay between notions of correctness and accuracy. As discussed above, safety could be trivially realized by always producing advisories consistent with the correctness property's output predicate, even at the cost of a high misprediction rate. But, since Algorithm 1 fuses both correctness and accuracy loss in the training algorithm, our expectation is that accuracy should not be compromised in pursuit of safety.
To justify this claim, we compare the network trained by A with the corresponding network trained without correctness in mind. During optimization, we train the network for at least 50 epochs using both sampled data points and re ned correctness property abstractions. is requirement of at least 50 epochs is to ensure that the training set is well-explored. A er 50 epochs, the training loop terminates once it ensures that the correctness loss reduces to 0.
In each training epoch, we collect (1) the standard cross entropy loss for predictions on individual data points and (2) the correctness loss as de ned in Section 4.3 on input abstractions. e sum of these two losses are used for back-propagation using the Adam optimizer (Kingma and Ba 2015) with mini-batches. e learning rate is initially set to 0.005 and decreases following a learning rate decay policy. e entire procedure follows Algorithm 1 except that we boost the training process by allowing the initial abstractions to be re ned even before optimization.
In each gure, we plot ve lines of accuracy statistics as the training iteration proceeds. A red bar of = 1 corresponding to standard data-driven training techniques is the base line of all other curves. A point in the gure represents the relative accuracy comparison w.r.t. standard practice at this epoch. Above the base line indicates it is performing be er. Figure 7 shows results for each network under our investigation in this experiment. Each sub gure plots the e ect of applying di erent abstraction mechanisms on accuracy, normalized to the results of the original (unsafe) network. All networks exhibited similar traits:
(1) When trained with a xed abstraction (the black line), accuracy with respect to the original network o en degrades substantially and also exhibits instability across epochs. As described earlier, a xed (sound) abstraction guarantees safety but the potential cost of imprecision. ese graphs quantify these costs which, for this benchmark, are o en signicant. (2) Using a re nement abstraction (e.g., "Abstraction 100" means the algorithm is allowed to generate 100 abstractions of the input space before optimization) improves accuracy. e ability to generate ne-grained partitions (e.g., "Abstraction 5000", the blue line) in many cases, in fact, improves accuracy compared to the baseline network. is is due to the algorithm treating safety and accuracy loss together yielding synergies that would not be realizable otherwise. Impact of abstraction refinement-guided training on network accuracy. Results are normalized to the corresponding (unsafe) networks. The black line represents networks trained with a fixed abstraction. Green, orange, and blue lines represent accuracy of networks constructed within dynamic input space refinement of 100, 1000, and 5000 abstractions applied before gradient-descent optimization.
Comparison with post facto training loop
Finally, we consider a comparison of our abstraction re nement-guided training for correct-byconstruction networks against a post facto training loop that calls an external veri er to collect counterexamples and feed to training loops. For this experiment, we used ReluVal (Wang et al. 2018c) as the veri er; as described above, ReluVal is a neural network veri er that supports the ACAS Xu datasets. In the beginning of each epoch, ReluVal is called to collect counterexamples regarding each individual predicate in the correctness property; we considered the property associated with network N 2 de ned as ϕ 1 ∧ ϕ 2 ∧ ϕ 3 ∧ ϕ 4 . e veri cation query in every epoch takes roughly 10 seconds to check network safety for this conjunction. If no counterexamples are returned, the network is veri ed correct. On the other hand, if some counterexamples are returned by ReluVal, we collect them and combine them with all past counterexamples. is set is used in the subsequent training procedure together with data points from the training set. We compute standard Cross Entropy loss for training set samples. For the counterexamples, however, we do not know which speci c label should be used to eliminate the error. Correctness properties only regulate what behaviors are allowed but does not enforce a speci c repair strategy when the property is violated. To address this issue, we simply accept all other output categories except the current erroneous one in the prediction and apply a Binary Cross Entropy loss function for this multi-label training exercise. e loss for training set samples and counterexamples are both considered so as to derive gradients and update the weights. is concludes an epoch.
In the experiment, we observe that a er one single epoch using both training samples and counterexamples, the network degenerate into naively predicting a single output category. is loops over and over with more epochs since the training set is not changing much. In every epoch, there are at most 4 new counterexamples being added to the training set (recall that the network should satisfy ϕ 1 ∧ ϕ 2 ∧ ϕ 3 ∧ ϕ 4 ); this is a very small number compared to the 10k samples in training set. We concluded our experiment a er 10 epochs since there was no improvement in safety or accuracy loss. We believe this result demonstrates the di culty of applying a counterexample-guided training loop strategy for generating safe networks compared an abstraction-guided methodology.
RELATED WORK
It is well-known that neural networks are not robust. is becomes a serious problem when ANNs are applied to safety-critical applications. Robust optimization techniques (e.g., (Goodfellow et al. 2015; Madry et al. 2018; Pei et al. 2017 )) aim to overcome this problem by trying to augment training data by adversarial examples at each training step. While empirical evidence shows that resulting models are robust against many a acks, we cannot guarantee that a di erent kind of adversary cannot falsify the model. is has driven the need for formal veri cation. Tremendous progress has been made in this investigation ranging from exact veri ers that run in exponential time and relaxed veri ers that are e cient but incomplete.
Exact ANN Veri ers. For ReLU networks, exact veri ers provide exact robustness bounds but are expensive and di cult to scale due to the NP-completeness for solving such a problem (as they perform exhaustive enumeration in the worst case). ey solve the veri cation problem by typically employing Mixed Integer Linear Programming solvers ( (Cheng et al. 2017; Du a et al. 2018; Fische i and Jo 2017; Lomuscio and Maganti 2017; ) or Satis ability Modulo eories solvers ( (Carlini et al. 2017; Ehlers 2017; Scheibler et al. 2015) ). Scaling these methods to large neural networks is challenging.
Relaxed ANN Veri ers. Relaxed veri ers trade completeness for computational e ciency by solving a convex relaxation of the veri cation problem. Incomplete methods provide robustness bounds that can be loose. However, they show much more promise to scale to larger and deeper ANNs than exact veri ers. For example, (Raghunathan et al. 2018b ) formulated the veri cation of ReLU networks as a quadratic programming problem, which can then be relaxed and solved using an e cient semide nite programming solver. Inspired by the success of applying program analysis to large so ware code bases, Abstract Interpretation-based techniques has been adapted to reason about ANNs by developing e cient abstract transformers that relax nonlinearity of activation functions into linear inequality constraints ( Singh et al. 2018 Singh et al. , 2019a ). Similar approaches ( (Wang et al. 2018a,b; Weng et al. 2018; ) encode nonlinearity via linear outer bounds of activation functions. Considering the dual of the underlying linear programming formulation, e cient veri ers have also been developed based on either the dual of the relaxed problem ( ) or the dual of the original nonconvex veri cation problem ( (Dvijotham et al. 2018a,b; Qin et al. 2019) ). Hybrid ANN veri ers that combine exact and relaxed ANN veri ers have also shown e ectiveness ( Singh et al. 2019a) ). Most of those veri ers focus on certi cation of robustness properties only and do not support veri able training of network-wide correctness properties.
Veri ed Training. As relaxed ANN veri ers can scale to large-size neural networks, they have the potential to be used inside the training loop to build neural models that are veri ably robust to norm-bounded adversarial perturbations. Since such veri ers can compute (i.e., minimize) an upper bound on the violation of the speci cation to verify, the upper bound can be used within a loss function (on the worst-case loss over all possible adversarial perturbations) to optimize ANNs through regular stochastic gradient descent (SGD) approaches. For example, the semi-de nite relaxation used in the work by (Raghunathan et al. 2018a ) provides a regularizer that encourages robustness. Similarly, as any feasible dual solution in linear programming provides a guaranteed upper bound on the solution of the primal problem, ) exploit the dual solution to compute tight activation bounds that, in turn, can yield a tight upper bound on how a speci cation is violated. Alternatively, (Dvijotham et al. 2018a ) exploits these activation bounds to optimize the dual solution using an additional veri er network. e closest approach to our se ing is the work by . ey introduced geometric abstractions that bound activations as they propagate through the network via abstract interpretation. Importantly, since these convex abstractions are di erentiable, neural networks can easily adapt to make the rather loose bound provided by abstract interpretation much tighter to improve the veri ed accuracy. A simple bounding technique based on interval bound propagation was also exploited in ) (similar to the interval domain from ) to train veri ably robust neural networks that even beat the state-of-the-art networks in image classi cation tasks, demonstrating that a correct-by-construction approach can indeed save the need of more expensive veri cation procedures in challenging domains. Most of these adversarial training approaches exploit universal approximations for handling local robustness. But they are o en too coarse-grained, using a universal L-norm loss, and may not be suitable for handling network-wide arbitrary correctness properties that are not directly tied to robustness. In contrast to these e orts, our approach uses a novel input space abstraction re nement loop to reduce imprecise gradients on an abstract domain to realize correctness.
Combining Logic Constraints and Neural Networks. Several prior works ((Bach et al. 2017; Fischer et al. 2019; Márquez-Neila et al. 2017; Minervini and Riedel 2018; Pathak et al. 2015; Xu et al. 2018) ) combine logic and neural networks by deriving a loss function that bridges neural output vectors and logical constraints with desirable mathematical properties, capturing how close the neural network' output is to satisfying logic constraints. e loss can then be minimized with standard gradient-based methods that train the network to meet the constraints for the given inputs and adversary examples that are found violating logical constraints (via optimization). Similarly, Probabilistic So Logic ((Evans and Grefenste e 2018; Kimmig et al. 2012) ) was also explored to translate logical constraints into continuous almost-everywhere di erentiable loss functions. (Hu et al. 2016 ) built on probabilistic so logic and presented a teacher-student framework that distills rules into the training. While experimental results showed that such methods e ectively guide the learning algorithm to achieve state-of-the-art accuracy on classi cation problems, they lack of the soundness guarantee that a trained model shall satisfy the logical constraints.
CONCLUSIONS
is paper presents a correct-by-construction toolchain that can train neural networks with provable guarantees. e key idea is to optimize a neural network over the abstraction of both the input space and the network itself. While the abstraction computed by abstract interpretation can be weak for general networks, we demonstrate that an appropriate correctness loss function and input space abstraction re nement allow the network to adapt such that the bound on the overapproximation is tight. Minimizing this upper bound on the worst-case correctness loss over all possible correctness counterexamples leads to a provably correct neural network. Our correct-byconstruction generation approach can be applied with standard neural network training algorithms, without comprising the accuracy of a trained model. Experimental results demonstrate that our technique can be used to realize trustworthy neural network systems.
A APPENDIX
A.1 Proofs for theorems and lemmas in Section 4 P T 3.5. By the properties of abstract domain in De nition 3.2. L A.1 (S N A ). ∀ abstractions S 1 , S 2 , S 1 and S 2 are non-overlapping =⇒ size(S 1 ∪ S 2 ) = size(S 1 ) + size(S 2 ). P L A.1. By de nition, S 1 and S 2 are non-overlapping means that ∀Φ ∈ S 1 , Ψ ∈ S 2 , Φ and Ψ are non-overlapping. Moreover, by De nition 4.3, abstractions S 1 and S 2 imply that any two distinct correctness properties in S 1 are non-overlapping, same for S 2 . Hence, we have that any two distinct correctness properties in S 1 ∪ S 2 are non-overlapping.
en by Inclusion-Exclusion Principle, size(S 1 ∪ S 2 ) equals to the sum of all sizes of individual correctness properties in S 1 ∪ S 2 , which happens to be size(S 1 ) + size(S 2 ). All cases are proved, thus proved the theorem that ∀ spli ings S 1 , S 2 , S 1 S 2 =⇒ size(S 1 ) = size(S 2 ). P T 4.6. By induction on De nition 4.5,
• When S 1 = S 2 , obviously F S 2 ;
• When S 2 = {Φ = (Φ in , Φ out )}: By De nition 4.3, from F S 1 we have
we have F (Φ in , Φ out ). Hence, F S 2 .
• When S 1 = S a ∧ S 2 = S c ∧ S a S b ∧ S b S c , by induction hypothesis
• When S 1 = S a ∪S c ∧S 2 = S b ∪S d ∧S a S b ∧S c S d , S a , S c are non-overlapping, and S b , S d are non-overlapping, by induction hypothesis F S a =⇒ F S b ∧ F S c =⇒ F S d . From F S a ∪ S c we have F S a ∧ F S c =⇒ F S b ∧ F S d =⇒ F S b ∪ S d =⇒ F S 2 . All cases are proved, thus proved the theorem that ∀F , S 1 , S 2 , S 1 S 2 ∧ F S 1 =⇒ F S 2 . P T 4.12. By induction on De nition 4.5,
• When S 2 = {Φ = (Φ in , Φ out )}:
Now that
we have
erefore, by eorem 4.9,
• When S 1 = S a ∧ S 2 = S c ∧ S a S b ∧ S b S c , by induction hypothesis we have, By De nition 4.10,
All cases are proved, thus proved the theorem that ∀S 1 , S 2 , S 1 S 2 =⇒ L D (F , S 1 ) ≤ L D (F , S 2 ). P T 4.13. First, we prove that the output S of code snippet from Line 10 to Line 19 in Algorithm 1 is a valid abstraction.
To show that S is a valid abstraction, we need to prove that any two distinct correctness properties in S are non-overlapping.
• is is obviously true among those untouched properties in S \ T .
• is also holds between any Φ ∈ S \ T and any Ψ re ned from T .
• For any two Ψ partitioned from two di erent correctness properties in T , such requirement holds as well.
• For any two Ψ partitioned from one correctness property in T , the partitioning operation ensures that any they are non-overlapping. Hence, S is a valid abstraction. We continue to prove that S S. Let T be the top K properties in S accounting for the largest non-zero portions in L and let R = S \T . From code snippet, we know that R ⊆ S as well. Without loss of generality, let S = T ∪R where T is the re ned abstraction from T . e call for partitioning heuristic (e.g., Algorithm 2) is just for e ciency. As long as it is partitioning every safety property, we have ∀(Φ in , Φ out ) ∈ T , their corresponding re ned abstractions
Since T is composed of all these {P in } k , Φ out , we have T T . R R ∧ T T ∧ S = R ∪ T ∧ S = R ∪ T =⇒ S S.
